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Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage can 
cause severe disease in poultry and wild birds, and occasionally in humans. In recent years, H5 
HPAI viruses of this lineage infecting poultry in Asia have spilled over into wild birds and spread 
via bird migration to countries in Europe, Africa, and North America. In 2016/2017, this spillover 
resulted in the largest HPAI epidemic on record in Europe, and was associated with an unusually 
high frequency of reassortments between H5 HPAI viruses and co-circulating low pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses. Here we show that the seven main H5 reassortant viruses had various 
combinations of gene segments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. Using detailed time-resolved phylogenetic 
analysis, most of these gene segments likely originated from wild birds and at dates and locations 
that corresponded to their hosts’ migratory cycles. However, some gene segments in two 
reassortant viruses likely originated from domestic anseriforms, either in spring 2016 in east 
China, or in autumn 2016 in central Europe. Our results demonstrate that, in addition to domestic 
anseriforms in Asia, both migratory wild birds and domestic anseriforms in Europe are relevant 
sources of gene segments for recent reassortant H5 HPAI viruses. The ease with which these H5 
HPAI viruses reassort, in combination with repeated spillovers of H5 HPAI viruses into wild birds, 
increase the risk of emergence of a reassortant virus that persists in wild bird populations, yet 
remains highly pathogenic for poultry. 
Significance Statement 
In 2016/2017, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of the subtype H5 spilled over into 
wild birds and caused the largest known HPAI epidemic in Europe, affecting poultry and wild 
birds. During its spread, the virus frequently exchanged genetic material (reassortment) with co-
circulating low pathogenic avian influenza viruses. To determine where and when these 
reassortments occurred, we analysed Eurasian avian influenza viruses and identified a large set 
of H5 HPAI reassortants. We found that new genetic material likely came from wild birds across 
their migratory range and from domestic ducks, not only in China, but also in central Europe. This 
knowledge is important to understand how the virus could adapt to wild birds and become 
established in wild bird populations. 
Main Text 
Introduction 
Infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus of the H5 A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 
(Gs/Gd) lineage can cause severe disease in birds and in mammals, including people (1, 2). 
Since the beginning of the century, H5 HPAI viruses have repeatedly spilled over from poultry to 
free-living wild birds, especially in Asia. This spillover in regions with a high poultry density and 
intensive interaction between wild bird and poultry populations has altered the epidemiology of H5 
HPAI viruses in several ways. First, migration of HPAI-virus-infected wild birds acts as a new 
route of long-distance spread of H5 HPAI viruses into countries with bird populations that were 
free of these viruses (3). Second, direct or indirect contact with infected wild birds is a new route 
of HPAI virus incursion into poultry farms (4-7). Third, H5 HPAI virus infection is a new source of 
considerable mortality in wild birds themselves, and may substantially affect population dynamics 
of wild birds and threaten highly protected species like the white-tailed eagle (Haliaeetus albicilla) 
and the peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) (8, 9). Because we have a poor understanding of wild 
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birds as a new niche for H5 HPAI viruses, it is difficult to design efficient surveillance 
programmes, as well as effective prevention and control measures. 
 
Since 1996, the Gs/Gd lineage of H5 HPAI viruses has evolved rapidly and is now highly diverse. 
Following the emergence of A/goose/Guangdong/1/96, the lineage has evolved into numerous 
genetically distinct clades 
(https://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/h5_nomenclature_clade2344/en/) (10). Several of 
these clades have spread via wild birds from Asia to Europe since 2004: clade 1 in 2004, clades 
2.2 and 2.2.1 from 2005 to 2007, clade 2.3.2 from 2008 to 2010, and clade 2.3.4.4 from 2014 to 
2019 (1, 3, 11, 12). Gs/Gd lineage H5 HPAI viruses are now endemic in areas of Asia and 
continue to evolve, so new epidemics are likely to occur.  
 
The routes by which H5 HPAI viruses are carried over long distances, as well as the particular 
migratory species involved, are still only roughly known. From wintering grounds of migratory 
birds in south-east Asia, H5 HPAI viruses are carried north to breeding grounds on the northern 
parts of the Eurasian and North American continents, and then either west to wintering grounds in 
Europe, east to wintering grounds in North America, or back south to wintering grounds in Asia 
(3). The species involved are thought to be long-distance migrants of the family Anatidae (ducks, 
geese, and swans). Several species in this family, e.g. Eurasian wigeon (Mareca penelope), 
Eurasian teal (Anas crecca) and northern pintail (Anas acuta), have migratory routes that 
correspond to the observed pattern of virus spread (3), have been found infected with H5 HPAI 
virus at different locations along their respective migratory routes (3) andcan be infected with and 
excrete H5 HPAI virus —at least under laboratory conditions—without showing detectable clinical 
signs (1, 13-16). 
 
In 2016 and 2017, H5 HPAI viruses (belonging to cluster B, Gochang-like) spread again widely 
across Eurasia, causing the largest and most widespread HPAI epidemic ever recorded in 
Europe: between October 2016 and August 2017, 1207 individual HPAI virus outbreaks in poultry 
holdings were reported in 24 European Union countries, and 1590 wild bird mortality events were 
recorded in 29 countries of the European Union and in Switzerland (17). In contrast, relatively few 
wild birds and poultry farms were affected in 2014/2015: between November 2014 and February 
2015, H5N8 HPAI was detected in only 11 poultry farms (turkey, duck, chicken) and other 
holdings and in a small number of wild waterfowl across five European countries, as well as in 
two mute swans (Cygnus olor) in Sweden (3, 18), indicating a marked difference between 
epidemics. 
 
During the 2016-2017 epidemic, five reassortant viruses were detected in Germany alone, to 
which the H5 HPAI virus contributed at least the clade 2.3.4.4 HA gene segment, and often also 
that clade’s corresponding M and NS gene segments, while co-circulating low pathogenic avian 
influenza (LPAI) viruses contributed gene segments coding for the other viral proteins (19). The 
genetic diversity generated through reassortment plays an important role in the evolution of 
influenza viruses (20) and may provide the opportunity for the adaptation of H5 HPAI virus to wild 
bird populations. Despite this, we know little about the genesis and spread of these reassortants. 
We therefore performed extensive phylogeographic and epidemiological analyses of the 2016-
2017 H5 HPAI virus epidemic, including analysis of the temporal and geographical spread of the 
reassortants and their individual gene segments, and of the avian species involved. Our main 
goals were to estimate where and when these reassortments occurred, and to identify which 
avian influenza viruses from which host species provided gene segments for reassortment. We 
used genetic sequences of avian influenza viruses obtained from poultry and wild birds world-
wide and shared through public databases, and epidemiological data obtained from the World 
Organisation for Animal Health. We focussed on HPAI viruses of H5 clade 2.3.4.4 collected 
between May 2016 and July 2017. Data were discussed within the “Global Consortium of H5N8 





h5n8/). The aim of this consortium is to foster data exchange and global analysis of H5Nx avian 




Classification of whole genome sequences of HPAI virus H5Nx into reassortants per gene 
segment. Sequence data for individual gene segments 1 (PB2), 2 (PB1), 3 (PA), 5 (NP), 7 (M) 
and 8 (NS) were classified into groups based on phylogenetic similarity, and sequence data for 
gene segment 6 (NA) were classified by subtype (see methods).  Using BEAST, time-scaled 
trees were inferred for each segment or subtype for segment 6 (Fig. 1 and 2).  The discontinuous 
character of the phylogenetic groups was consistent with the importation of novel sequences (i.e. 
reassortment or genetic shift), suggesting that these groups corresponded to reassortants (Table 
1). These results suggested that segment 4 (the HA gene) had four main combinations (A-D) with 
segment 1, three (A, C, D) with segment 2, four (A, B, D, E) with segment 3, five (A, B, D, E, F) 
with segment 5, two (N8 and N5) with segment 6, and one (A) with segments 7 and 8. The 
phylogenetic analysis of the eight gene segments indicated that, in some cases, multiple gene 
segments transferred in the same reassortment event. An example is the simultaneous 
reassortment of gene segments 1, 3 and 5 (Table 1; Fig. 1 and 2). 
 
By Influenza Reassortment analysis via Supernetworks (IRIS), a total of 446 full genome 
sequences of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 HPAI viruses could be divided into 11 distinct reassortants, 7 of 
which were common. Supernetworks are calculated from all eight segment-sorted maximum 
likelihood trees and visualize the phylogenetic relationships of each HPAI virus where taxa are 
represented by nodes and their relationships as edges (51).  This corresponded very closely to 
the reassortants distinguished by BEAST analysis.  The reassortants formed four groups: group I, 
first detected in May 2016; group II, first detected in August 2016 and including the reassortant 
that caused the main epidemic in wild birds and poultry in Europe; group III, first detected in 
December 2016 and including a change of the NA serotype from 8 to 5; and group IV, also first 
detected in December 2016 (Table 1; Fig. 3 and 4). 
 
Spatio-temporal distribution of the main reassortants. The clade H5N8 HPAI virus was 
widespread in Eurasia in 2016, and extended into North Africa (Fig. 5). During 2016 and 2017, 
the virus spread widely from East Asia (Table S1) westward to Europe, eastward to north Asia, 
and southward to south Asia and Africa between the second quarter of 2016 to the second 
quarter of 2017. In the second quarter of 2016, the virus was detected sporadically in north-
central China (Qinghai Lake) and the border between Russia and Mongolia (Uvs-Nuur Lake) (Fig. 
S1). The westward spread to Europe started with infrequent detections in south-central Russia 
(Chany Lake andKurgan, in Western Siberia) in the third quarter of 2016 (Fig. S2) and west 
Russia (Tatarstan) in the fourth quarter of 2016 (Fig. S3). Subsequently, the virus was detected at 
great frequency in all parts of Europe (north, south, east, west, central; Table S1) in the fourth 
quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 (Fig. S4), followed by infrequent detections in the 
second quarter of 2017 (Fig. S5). The virus also was detected in North Africa (Egypt) and south 
Asia (India) in the fourth quarter of 2016, in central Africa (Congo) in the second quarter of 2017, 
in north Asia (Kamchatka, Russia) in the fourth quarter of 2016, and in East Asia (South Korea) 
from the fourth quarter of 2016 to the second quarter of 2017. The species affected were primarily 
wild birds in the second and third quarters of 2016, both wild birds and poultry in the fourth 
quarter of 2016 and first quarter of 2017, and poultry in the second quarter of 2017 (Fig. S1 to 
S5). There was no apparent spatial association between the distribution of sampled viruses and 
the density of the poultry population in Eurasia (Fig. S6). During the period 2016/2017, H5N8 
HPAI viruses were not detected in other parts of the world, including North and South America. 
 
Inferred hosts, dates, and locations of origin of the seven main reassortants. 
Reassortant #1 (CABAD8AA; n = 16). This is the most ancestral reassortant in our analyses. The 





(MRCGA) and February 2016 for the most recent common ancestor (MRCA) (Fig. S7). The gene 
segments are inferred to originate from west, south and east China for the MRCGA and north 
China for the MRCA. The inferred hosts of nearly all gene segments of both the MRCGA and 
MRCA are either long-range anseriform migrants or wild anseriforms. The exception is gene 
segment 6 (NA), for which the inferred hosts are domestic anseriforms. These dates and 
locations suggest that the MRCA of CABAD8AA originated at the end of the wintering period 
2015/2016 or beginning of spring migration 2016, with gene segment 6 contributed by domestic 
anseriforms from east China, and remaining gene segments contributed by wild anseriforms 
(including long-range migrants) from wintering locations in west, south, and east China. It cannot 
be ruled out that some gene segments, e.g. 3 and 7, were carried further south during autumn 
migration 2015, to unsampled wintering locations in south Asia, and then back North China during 
spring migration. 
 
The first actual CABAD8AA detections were from May 2016 on Qinghai Lake in China and Uvs-
Nuur Lake at the Mongolian-Russian border, respectively (21, 22), just north of the median 
inferred location of origin of the MRCA. This suggests that this reassortant was carried further 
north during spring migration 2016, presumably by wild birds on the way to breeding locations in 
north Russia. The first detected virus (A/Brown-headed_Gull/Qinghai/ZTO1-LU/2016) had a HPAI 
virus H5 clade 2.3.4.4b derived backbone of segments 4, 6 and 8, combined with   
segments 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 from different Asian LPAI viruses (21, 22). After May 2016, this 
reassortant was not detected until May 2017, when it re-emerged in domestic ducks in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (23). 
 
Reassortant #2 (CAEAF8AA; n = 13). The new gene segments in this reassortant, compared to 
CABAD8AA, are segments 3 (PA) and 5 (NP). The inferred hosts of these new gene segments 
could be either wild anseriforms, long-range anseriform migrants, other wild birds, or domestic 
anseriforms (Fig. S8). The origin dates are estimated to be May 2016 for the MRCGA and August 
2016 for the MRCA. The gene segments are inferred to originate from almost the full breadth of 
Eurasia (west Poland to east China) for the MRCGA, and from a narrower breadth of Eurasia 
(east Azerbaijan to west China, but most locations in the region centred on the Kazakhstan-China 
border) for the MRCA. These dates and locations suggest that the MRCA of CAEAF8AA 
originated during pre-migratory aggregation or autumn migration in the Kazakhstan-China border 
region. 
 
The first actual CAEAF8AA detection (A/gadwall/Chany/97/2016) was from September 2016 in 
Russia. It was later found in wild birds at widely dispersed locations, from Italy to Korea, and from 
Russia to Egypt and India. Except for Russia, these sites might be wintering locations of wild 
migratory birds. 
 
Reassortant #3 (AAAAA8AA; n = 109). This is the main virus detected in the 2016-2017 epidemic 
in Europe. The new gene segments in this reassortant, compared to CAEAF8AA, are segments 1 
(PB2), 3 (PA), and 5 (NP). The inferred hosts of these new gene segments are long-range 
anseriform migrants (segment 1), other wild birds (segment 3), or either of these two groups 
(segment 5) (Fig. S9).  The origin dates are estimated to be June 2016 for the MRCGA and July 
2016 for the MRCA. The gene segments are inferred to originate from Belarus to India for the 
MRCGA, and from a much more restricted area: Belarus to west Kazakhstan for the MRCA. 
These dates and locations suggest that the MRCA of AAAAA8AA originated during pre-migratory 
aggregation or early autumn migration 2016 somewhere between Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
 
The first actual AAAAA8AA detection (A/gadwall/Kurgan/2442/2016) was on 27 August 2016 in 
central Russia at the longitude of the Ural Mountains. The second detection occurred on 2 
October 2016 in Tatarstan, Russia, several hundred kilometers westward. From November 2016 
onwards, this virus was detected in wild birds in coastal regions of the Baltic and North Seas, as 





It also was found in wild birds in Ukraine, south Russia (Krasnodar), Hungary and Italy. This 
suggests that the virus was carried west during autumn migration of wild birds in 2016, on the 
way to wintering locations in central, west and south Europe. 
 
Throughout Europe, this virus caused both massive die-offs in wild birds and outbreaks in poultry 
farms, lasting until at least summer 2017 (8, 19, 24-30). 
 
Reassortant #4 (AADAA8AA; n = 14). The new gene segment in this reassortant, compared to 
AAAAA8AA, is segment 3 (PA). The inferred hosts of this gene segment are other wild birds (Fig. 
S10). The origin dates are estimated to be August 2016 for the MRCGA and October 2016 for the 
MRCA. The gene segments of the MRCA are inferred to originate from Germany to west Russia. 
These dates and locations suggest that the MRCA of AADAA8AA originated during late autumn 
migration 2016.  
 
The actual detections of AADAA8AA were first in the Netherlands in November 2016, and then in 
Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, in February 2017. This suggests that, following its generation in 
autumn 2016, this reassortant was restricted to a limited number of wintering locations in a 
central and west Europe. 
 
Reassortant #5 (DCBAE5AA; n = 15). The new gene segments in this reassortant, compared to 
CABAD8AA, are segments 1 (PB2), 5 (NP), and 6 (NA). The inferred hosts of these gene 
segments are wild anseriforms (segments 1 and 5), with ancestry of segment 6 remaining 
unclear, although segment 6 clustered most closely with those of LPAI viruses of the subtypes 
H9N5 or H7N5 found in 2015 in shorebirds in Asia (A/common redshank/Singapore/F83-1/2015, 
KU144675; A/black-tailed godwit/Bangladesh/24734/2015, KY635758) (Fig. S11). The origin 
dates are estimated to be June 2016 for the MRCGA and July 2016 for the MRCA. The gene 
segments are inferred to originate from west-central Russia to north-west China to Thailand for 
the MRCGA, and from south-central Russia for the MRCA. These dates and locations suggest 
that the MRCA of DCBAE5AA originated during the breeding season or pre-migratory 
aggregation 2016. 
 
The actual detections of DCBAE5AA were in Georgia, the Czech Republic, Italy and Germany 
from December 2016 to February 2017, suggesting that the reassortant was carried by wild birds 
during autumn migration 2016 to wintering locations in Europe. This virus caused outbreaks in 
poultry farms in Croatia and Germany. The reassortant also was detected in eastern Eurasia—on 
the Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia—in October 2016, which it likely reached via a different 
migration route. 
 
Reassortant #6 (BABAB8AA; n = 56). This is the second most common virus detected during the 
2016-2017 epidemic in Europe, after AAAAA8AA. The new gene segments in this reassortant, 
compared to CABAD8AA, are segments 1 (PB2) and 5 (NP). The inferred host of segment 1 is 
unclear (either domestic anseriforms, or wild-other), and the inferred host of segment 5 is 
domestic anseriforms, (Fig. S12). The origin dates are estimated to be July 2016 for the MRCGA 
and September 2016 for the MRCA.  The gene segments are inferred to originate from Ukraine to 
west Russia for the MRCGA, and from several hundred kilometers due west—Hungary to 
Ukraine—for the MRCA. These dates and locations suggest that the MRCA of BABAB8AA 
originated during autumn migration 2016. 
 
The first actual detections of BABAB8AA were in Croatia, Hungary and France from October 
2016. This virus was later detected further north, in Germany and Poland in winter 2016-2017 
(19, 30). This suggests that the reassortant spread in a restricted part of Europe during late 
autumn migration and the wintering period, and potentially involved spillback of gene segments 






Reassortant #7 (BDBAB8AA; n = 6). The new gene segment in this reassortant, compared to 
BABAB8AA, is segment 2 (PB1). The inferred hosts of this gene segment are wild anseriforms or 
long-range anseriform migrants (Fig. S13). The origin dates are November 2016 for both the 
MRCGA and the MRCA. However, gene segment 2 has an earlier origin date, May 2016, 
suggesting it reached west Europe in a two-step process: transport to breeding location in Siberia 
during spring migration 2016, and transport to wintering location in west Europe during autumn 
migration 2016. The gene segments of the MRCGA are inferred to originate from a restricted 
region—Germany to Ukraine—except for gene segment 2, from west China; those of the MRCA 
are inferred to originate from an even more restricted region, Poland to Ukraine. These dates and 
locations suggest that the MRCA of BDBAB8AA originated during late autumn migration 2016 or 
wintering period 2016-2017. 
 
The actual detections of BDBAB8AA were first in Poland and Germany, from December 2016 
onwards.  This suggests that the reassortant originated locally in Europe due to a reassortment of 
its predecessor, BABAB8AA, with a gene segment from a wild anseriform, likely a long-range 
migrant from Siberia. This virus caused outbreaks in poultry farms in Poland, Germany, and 
Russia. 
 
Summary of the genesis and spread of seven main reassortants. In summary (Table 2, 
Figure S14, Table S2), most of the new gene segments for the reassortant viruses originated 
from wild birds (wild anseriforms, including long-range anseriforms, or other wild birds), and the 
dates and locations of origin correspond with areas used by wild birds during different phases of 
their migratory cycles: wintering period to spring migration in North China, Mongolia, and Russia 
(Siberia) for reassortant #1, breeding period to autumn migration in 
Belarus/Kazakhstan/China/Russia for reassortants #2, #3, and #5, autumn migration in 
Hungary/Germany/Ukraine/Russia for reassortants #4 and #6, and autumn migration to wintering 
period in Poland/Ukraine for reassortant #7. The only new gene segments not thought to originate 
from wild birds were gene segment 6 of reassortant #1 and gene segment 5 of reassortant #6; 
these gene segments were inferred to originate from domestic anseriforms. 
 
Migratory patterns of wild birds found positive for H5N8 HPAI virus in the European Union. 
Based on reports to the OIE, H5N8 HPAI viruses were detected in a total of 56 species found 
dead in the European Union between 1 October 2016 and 5 July 2017 (17). Out of these 56 
species, 14 species had migratory populations that wintered in the European Union and bred at 
longitudes at least 60 degrees East, which is at the longitude of the Ural Mountains (Table 3). Of 
these 14 species, 13 were waterbirds belonging to the family Anatidae (including ducks, geese 




The overall impact of 2016/2017 epidemic of H5N8 HPAI virus (belonging to cluster B, Gochang-
like) differed markedly from the 2014/2015 epidemic of H5N8 HPAI virus (belonging to cluster A, 
Buan/Donglim-like), both in geographical focus and the breadth of the host species affected. The 
2016/2017 epidemic caused the largest recorded HPAI epidemic in poultry in Europe (17, 31), but 
did not spread to North America or Japan. In contrast, the 2014/2015 epidemic resulted in only 
limited poultry mortality in Europe and Japan (3), but caused major losses in the USA, and to a 
lesser extent in Canada, with over 48 million heads of poultry lost or destroyed 
(https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/poultry/downloads/Epidemio 
logic-Analysis-Sept-2015.pdf). During the 2016/2017 epidemic, there was high mortality in free-
living wild birds in Europe. In the Netherlands alone, approximately 13 600 wild birds of 71 
species were found dead during the epidemic (8). Considering an estimated detection rate of only 
10-25%, the actual mortality probably was much higher, and represented substantial percentages 
of wintering populations of several species in the Netherlands: 5% of tufted ducks and Eurasian 





during the 2016/2017 epidemic, H5N8 HPAI virus caused unusually high mortality in white-tailed 
eagles, with 17 laboratory-confirmed fatal infections in Germany between November 2016 and 
April 2017 (9); and in a well-monitored population of mute swans (Cygnus olor) in the U.K., 
causing an age-adjusted mortality of 143 per 1000 birds (32). In most cases, the effect of this 
mortality of wild birds at the population level was not clear. However, the mortality rate of tufted 
ducks in parts of the Netherlands was so high (estimated at 25% of the local population) that 
population dynamics might have been affected substantially (8). In contrast, high wild bird 
mortality in Europe was not recorded in 2014/2015 (3). In the USA in 2014/2015, the majority of 
wild ducks did not show clear clinical signs of disease, although there was high mortality of wild 
raptor species (eagles, hawks, falcons, and owls) and wild geese (33). Experimental infections 
confirmed that the 2016/2017 H5N8 HPAI virus was substantially more virulent in domestic ducks 
than that from 2014/2015 (34). 
 
We speculate that the high virulence of the H5N8 HPAI virus in 2016/2017 may be a side-effect of 
selection for high excretion in wild waterbirds. Higher virus excretion not only results in more 
efficient transmission among hosts, but also in increased severity of clinical signs. According to 
the intermediate virulence (or trade off) hypothesis, there is selective advantage for higher 
excretion up to the point that higher transmission is counteracted by increased clinical signs and 
even death (35). It is at this point of intermediate virulence that the virus has the greatest 
evolutionary fitness. This fitness level depends in part on the level of population immunity, which 
will depend on the proportion of naïve birds and other circulating strains (32). It remains to be 
seen whether virulence of the H5N8 HPAI virus will change as it further evolves in the 
international metapopulation of wild birds and poultry. It also remains to be seen how the zoonotic 
potential of the H5N8 HPAI virus will change; based on experimental ferret infections with three of 
the viruses discussed here, the adaption of H5N8 HPAI virus to avian hosts was associated with 
a reduced zoonotic potential (34, 36). 
 
The range of wild bird species involved in the 2016/2017 epidemic in Europe differed from that in 
2014/2015, although non-uniform sampling over time and space cannot be ruled out as a 
potential bias. In 2014/2015, only four wild bird species were found positive for H5N8 in Europe. 
In contrast, 56 species were found positive in Europe in 2016/2017 (17). Of these 56 species, 14 
had migratory populations that wintered in the European Union and bred at longitudes at least 60 
degrees East (Table 3). These 14 species included the same species as found in 2014/2015 
(Eurasian wigeon, common teal, mallard, and mute swan), but also 10 others. Thus, in 2016/2017 
there was evidence for many more wild bird species that could have transported H5N8 viruses 
from breeding areas in Siberia to wintering areas in Europe. Which of these species transport 
virus remains to be determined, and requires more detailed investigation of the candidate hosts, 
both in the context of avian influenza epidemiology and long-range movement ecology. 
 
Reassortment frequency was much higher in the 2016/2017 epidemic than in the 2014/2015 
epidemic, and than in the European epidemic of H5N1 HPAIV in 2006/2007. In 2016/2017, 11 
reassortants were detected (Fig. 3), of which 7 were common (Table 1, Fig. 4). In 2014/2015, 
three reassortants were detected in North America (10), and none elsewhere (3). For the 
reassortment of gene segments from two influenza viruses to occur, both viruses need to infect 
the same host cell at the same time. Possible reasons for the high frequency of reassortment in 
2016/2017 may be related to the extent and timing of the epidemic, the host range infected by 
H5N8 HPAI virus, target tissues infected by H5N8 virus, and the ease with which the H5N8 HPAI 
virus reassorts with other influenza viruses, e.g. due to special features of some gene segments. 
The extent of the epidemic in wild birds was much greater in Europe in 2016/2017 than in 
2014/2015, and may explain the higher frequency of reassortants in 2016/2017. Similarly, the fact 
that the 2014/2015 epidemic was greater in the USA than in Europe may explain the occurrence 
of reassortants in the USA (10, 37). Based on estimated MRCAs, the epidemic in Europe in 
2016/2017 (MRCA of most common reassortant #3: July) started one month earlier than in 





virus infection in wild waterbirds in autumn (38), thereby increasing the chance of reassortment 
between H5N8 HPAI virus and LPAI virus. The likelihood of the two peaks coinciding depends on 
how long it takes a virus to reach peak prevalence after its appearance in a wild waterfowl 
population. Although the host range of wild waterbirds infected with H5N8 HPAI virus in Europe in 
2016/2017 was larger than in 2014/2015, dabbling duck species, particularly common teal and 
mallard, were found infected with H5N8 HPAI virus in both epidemics (Table 3). These latter 
species are considered to have the highest prevalence of LPAI virus infection (39) and therefore 
considered to be important "mixing vessels" between HPAI virus and LPAI virus. Based on 
experimental infections of Pekin ducks, the H5N8 HPAI virus of 2016/2017 had greater tropism 
for the small intestine than that of 2014/2015 (34), and therefore may have had a greater chance 
for reassortment with LPAI viruses, which mainly target the intestine in wild waterbirds (40). Even 
before 2016/2017, there was clear evidence that—unlike other clades of H5 HPAI virus, which 
are mostly found as H5N1—the H5 HPAI segment of the clade 2.3.4.4 viruses reassorted 
frequently, acquiring NA segments including N5, N2, N8, and N6 (3, 12). This indicates that the 
gene constellation of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 HPAI viruses is promiscuous, allowing efficient 
reassortment with gene segments from co-circulating LPAI viruses (3, 19). The range of wild bird 
species in which H5N8 HPAI virus was detected, the important role of wild birds as donors of new 
gene segments for reassortant viruses, and the inferred timing and location of reassortment 
events provide valuable support for continued surveillance of avian influenza in wild bird 
populations, and provide information to improve the efficiency of such surveillance. 
 
The origin of gene segments of the reassortant viruses was not only wild birds, but also poultry. 
Specifically, gene segment 6 of reassortant #1 and gene segments 1, 2, 5, and 6 of reassortant 
#6 were inferred to originate from domestic anseriforms (Table 2). Transfer of LPAIV gene 
segments between domestic anseriforms and wild birds has been observed before in Asia (41). 
Based on phylogenetic analysis, most of the reassortants of HPAI virus H5 clade 2.3.4.4 
observed between 2006 and 2012 were generated in domestic anseriforms, and particularly 
domestic anseriforms in Eastern Asia (China) (3). However, this is the first time that spillback 
from domestic birds to wild birds has been observed in Europe, and implies that poultry 
populations in Europe form an additional source of viral genetic material for reassortment of 
circulating H5 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4 viruses. 
 
An intriguing aspect of the 2016/2017 reassortants is the lack of reassortment involving gene 
segments 7 (M) and 8 (NS) in the timespan of this study. Among the seven most common 
reassortants, segments 1, 2, 3 and 5 had three to five reassortments, segment 6 had only two 
reassortments, and segments 7 and 8 had no reassortments at all (Table 1). We did not consider 
segment 4 (HA), because the selection of genome sequences for analysis were based on 
segment 4 belonging to H5 HPAI virus clade 2.3.4.4, so any reassortments of this gene segment 
would automatically have been discounted. In the three reassortants detected during the 
2014/2015 epidemic in North America (33), reassortment was observed for gene segments 2, 3, 
and 6, but not for gene segments 1, 5, and 7. Therefore, the lack of reassortment of gene 
segment 7 (M1) is common to both the 2014/2015 and the 2016/2017 reassortants. It appears 
that some gene segments (1, 2, 3, 5, 6) of the H5 HPAI 2.3.4.4 virus clade can be switched 
without noticeable loss in fitness, while switching was not observed for other segments (7, 
perhaps 8). It remains to be determined whether (i) selective epistasis occurs between segments 
4 and 7, such that particular combinations are especially fit, or (ii) there is some mechanistic 
reason why reassortment events do not occur between segments 4 and 7; for example, the viral 
RNA packaging signals in the segments might play a role (42, 43). Further factors have to be 
identified by future studies using e.g. reverse genetics and in vivo experiments with the different 
reassortants. Caveats in a global phylogeographic analysis such as this one is that the dataset 
depends on the availability of sequence information, and that sampling of poultry and wild birds 
may be biased and differ per country. However, the large amount of data collected and analysed 






In conclusion, the 2016/2017 H5NX HPAI virus has caused the largest known HPAI epidemic in 
Europe, with high mortality in both poultry and wild birds, involvement of at least 14 long-distance 
migratory bird species, and the generation of an unusually high number of reassortant viruses. 
Further studies are required to (i) understand the relationship between level of virulence of the 
2016/2017 H5NX HPAI virus and its fitness in wild bird populations, e.g. by comparative 
experimental infections, (ii) to determine the overlap in breeding areas in Siberia among long-
distance migratory birds wintering in Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America, e.g. through 
satellite telemetry, and (iii) to determine the viral, host-related, and environmental circumstances 
that favour the generation of reassortants between H5NX HPAI and LPAI viruses, e.g. by 
experimental exchange of gene segments among genetically engineered viruses. This knowledge 
is critical to evaluate the risk of evolution of a H5NX HPAI virus that is able to be maintained in 
wild waterbird populations in absence of its presence in poultry. Should H5NX HPAI become 
established in wild waterbird populations, eradication will no longer be possible, and this disease 
will continue to pose a global risk for animal and human health in the foreseeable future. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Sequence data. Sequence data obtained from field isolates collected from domestic and wild 
birds were contributed by the partners from 25 member countries in the Global Consortium for 
H5N8 Avian Influenza Viruses. The data were shared via the EpiFlu™ database from the Global 
Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) and the International Nucleotide Sequence 
Database Collaboration (INSDC). Additional viral sequences from both GISAID and INSDC were 
also used, including other clade 2.3.4.4 sequences and non-H5 sequences. Data used included 
viral sequence data, host species, and date and location of sampling. Where specific location or 
information on province or city level was not uploaded, it was extracted by matching country and 
outbreak date with entries from official sources. The data used for analysis consisted of (i) 240 
isolates (232 complete genomes, 8 partial genomes) from 25 different countries during the period 
May 2016 to July 2017, including viruses of the subtypes H5N8 (218), H5N5 (21) and H5N6 (1), 
from domestic (93) and wild birds (147) (Table S3, Fig. 1 and 2), and (ii) an expanded data set of 
251-279 sequences per internal segment, 284 sequences for segment 4 (H5), 236 sequences for 
segment 6 (N8), and 20 sequences for segment 6 (N5) (Table S4). The data providers are 
summarized and acknowledged (Table S5). The additional sequences were chosen from BLAST 
analyses to be genetically close to the different groups (labelled groups A-G; Fig. 1 and 2), but 
from earlier time points and not restricted to any particular subtype. Specifically, BLAST analyses 
were performed on an early representative of each group in each segment, retrieving up to 500 
sequences from GISAID.  Neighbour joining trees were created for all the unique retrieved 
sequences and original data set, and sequences within the larger clades encompassing the 
clades of the original data and also including sequences from earlier time points were selected.  
The earliest sequences in the extended datasets were from: 2014 for segments 1, 5, 6-N8, 7, 8; 
autumn 2011 for segments 2 and 3; autumn 2009 for segment 4; and spring 2015 for segment 6-
N5. 
 
Phylogenetic analysis using BEAST. 
Time-scaled trees. Bayesian time-resolved phylogenetic trees were estimated using BEAST 
1.10.4 (44) using  the SRD06 nucleotide substitution with a four-category gamma distribution 
model of site-specific rate variation and separate site partitions for codon positions 1+2 versus 
position 3. We used a HKY substitution model, an uncorrelated relaxed clock with a log-normal 
distribution, and two coalescent tree priors (constant population size and the flexible skygrid tree 
prior (45)).  
 
For dataset (i), at least two independent MCMC chains for each internal segment, segment 4-H5 
and segment 6-N8 segments were run. Each chain consisted of 200,000,000 steps, was sampled 
every 20,000 steps, and the first 10% of samples discarded as burn-in. Segment-N5 was run with 





of sequences.  The MCMC settings were chosen to achieve a post burn-in effective sample size 
of at least 200.  A post burn-in sample of 1,000 posterior trees was obtained for each segment (or 
N-subtype) in the dataset.   
 
Time-scaled trees with group labels. Segments 1, 2, 3, and 5 were divided into well-supported 
monophyletic distinct groups with labels A to G, with A having the greatest number of sequences; 
segment 6 (the NA gene) was divided into NA subtypes, and were thus N8 or N5. Genetic 
diversity in segments 4, 7, and 8 was limited and a distinct clade structure similar to segments 1, 
2, 3 and 5 was not present, so these were placed in only one group (labelled A). The average 
genetic pairwise genetic distances within groups was 0.003 – 0.006 for segments 1, 2, 3, and 5, 
0.006 – 0.008 for segments 4, 6 (N8), 7 and 8, and 0.014 for segment 6 (N5). The latter was due 
to a single more distant sequence (Fig. 2). The average pairwise genetic distances between 
groups was larger than 0.025 in all cases. 
 
Therefore, the annotation for each reassortant consisted of a letter for each of gene segments 1 
to 5, 7, and 8, and a numeral for gene segment 6, e.g. CABAD8AA. These groups and subtypes 
were mapped as discrete traits onto the posterior sample of time-scaled trees of all segments, 
and the number of label changes were estimated in BEAST (using a Markov Jumps model (46) 
with an asymmetric transition rate matrices) to indicate the relative frequency of reassortment of 
the internal segments.  
 
Time-scaled trees with spatial coordinates. The expanded dataset (ii) was split into groups on a 
per segment basis, generating several smaller datasets (Table S6).  Time-scaled trees of these 
groups were inferred with BEAST using the SRD06 model, a relaxed log-normal clock model, and 
constant population size models.  Groups that were adjacent to each other in a neighbour joining 
tree of the expanded dataset, and that shared a common outgroup in the expanded dataset, were 
combined for the purposes of inferring BEAST trees (e.g. segment 1 groups A and C, segment 3 
groups A and B).  In this way, closely related sequences from the Autumn-Winter 2016/2017 
epidemics along with other previously isolated and closely related sequences not from those 
epidemics were analysed together with the result that analyses of diverse groups and trees 
containing long branches were avoided.  For each dataset, the post burn-in independent BEAST 
MCMC chains were combined and then down-sampled to create posterior tree sets containing 
1,000 trees. As before, MCMC settings were chosen to achieve a post burn-in effective sample 
size of at least 200. 
 
Phylogeographic continuous trait spatial diffusion models were inferred for each of the data sets 
using the 1000 posterior trees as an empirical tree distribution and MCMC chain lengths of 
1100,000 steps, sampling every 1000 steps.  Different diffusion models were tested using the N8 
data, and the homogeneous Brownian motion model with latitude and longitude of the sampling 
locations was selected for use with all.  In cases where exactly the same latitude and longitude 
for isolates were reported, a small random jitter of mean 0.001 degrees was applied. 
 
Origin of reassortments estimation. Summary maximum clade credibility trees (MCC) for the post 
burn-in posterior time-scaled trees with spatial location reconstructions were created using 
TreeAnnotator. The MCC trees contained estimates of the time and location (and the 95% 
highest posterior density [HPD] confidence intervals of these values) at each internal (ancestral) 
node. Estimates of the origin of a reassortant genotype were made for each of its constituent 
segments by finding the MRCA nodes for all the sequences of each reassortant code (e.g. 
AAAAA8AA) in each of the corresponding MCC trees, and reporting the time and location of 
these identified internal tree nodes.  The time and location of the immediate ancestors (‘most 
recent common grand ancestors’, MRCGA) of these identified MRCAs are also reported in order 






Host species origin of reassortments estimation. In addition to the time-scaled trees with spatial 
coordinates, the inferred host-type of the MRCA and the most recent common grand ancestor 
(MRCGA) nodes were also estimated by using a five-state-structured coalescent approximation 
model (MASCOT) for host species: domestic anseriform birds (Dom-ans), domestic galliform 
birds (Dom-gal), long-range migratory wild anseriform birds (Wild-ans-long), other wild anseriform 
birds (Wild-ans), and other wild birds (Wild-other) (Table S7). The MRCGA and MRCA host 
categories were extracted in order to indicate whether a gene segment was established in a 
particular host category, or whether it was switching between host categories.   Those species 
that have both long-distance and short-distance/resident populations—mallard, tufted duck, mute 
swan, and common goldeneye were placed in the "Wild—ans" category to be conservative.  
Additionally the one peacock sample was classified with the “Wild-other” birds.  Results from 
these models are reported as probabilities for each host-type state at the node of interest.  These 
structured coalescent approximate models are less susceptible to sampling bias than the simpler 
discrete trait models, and are considered to be appropriate for analysing cross species 
transmission in avian influenza (47). 
 
Phylogenetic analysis using IRIS. For Influenza Reassortment analysis vIa Supernetworks 
(IRIS), full genome sequences were retrieved from the Influenza Research database 
(www.fludb.org) and the EpiFlu™ database (www.gisaid.org) (Table S8). We acknowledge the 
laboratories for providing sequence information via EpiFlu™ (Table S5). Full genome sequences 
of influenza A H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were manually curated and annotated using Geneious 
v11.1.5 (Biomatters, Auckland, New Zealand). The sequences were sorted into segments and 
segment-based multiple alignment using fast Fourier transform (MAFFT) (48) was performed. 
Subsequently, maximum likelihood phylogenetic analyses were performed using Randomized 
Axelerated Maximum Likelihood (RAxML) (49), including 1,000 bootstrap replicates. SplitsTree4 
(50) was used to generate a supernetwork (51) from the resulting trees. Supernetworks are 
calculated consensus split networks obtained as combination of all eight generated segment-
sorted maximum likelihood trees. They represent and visualize the phylogenetic relationships of 
each Influenza virus where taxa are represented by nodes and their relationship as edges. Data 
were filtered to omit sequences with a collection date after 1 July 2017. 
 
Maps. Maps were created with Desktop 10.5.1 (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA) using the locations 
recorded in the GISAID database and background layers from ArcGIS Online (www.arcgis.com) 
and the Gridded Livestock of the World (GLW 3) (52) to show date and location of sampling of the 
virus sequences used for the above phylogenetic analysis by IRIS (Table S8) . Birds sampled at 
the same location were manually shifted slightly to avoid completely overlapping shapes in the 
map display. 
 
Annual migration patterns of wild birds involved in H5NX HPAI epidemics. Our phylogenetic 
analyses indicate that migrating wild birds carried HPAI virus H5NX to Europe in 2016/2017. 
Therefore, we first determined which wild bird species had been reported positive for H5NX virus 
in the European Union between 1 October 2016 and 5 July 2017, based on information extracted 
from the World Organisation for Animal Health (https://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-
world/update-on-avian-influenza/) and summarized by the European Food Safety Authority (53). 
Subsequently, we selected those species that had populations that migrated long distances, i.e. 
wintering in the European Union and breeding beyond at least longitude 60 degrees East. We 
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Legends for figures 
 
Figure 1. Bayesian time-resolved phylogenetic trees for gene segments 1 to 4 of H5NX HPAI 
viruses sampled between May 2016 and July 2017, and for which whole genomes were 
sequenced. Distinct clades (groups) in the trees are given different coloured branches. The 
number of distinct groups differs per gene segment: four for segment 1, three for segment 2, five 
for segment 3, and one for segment 4.  Furthermore, all eight segments of each virus are 
represented as eight parallel bars at the tips of each tree, with the colours in each segment's bar 
corresponding to the branches of the individual gene sequences to indicate reassortment. The 
final bar represents the geographic locations of the sequences in the tree.   
 
Figure 2. Bayesian time-resolved phylogenetic trees for gene segments 5 to 8 of H5NX HPAI 
viruses sampled between May 2016 and July 2017, and for which whole genomes were 
sequenced. For segment 6, there are separate phylogenetic trees for subtypes N8 and N5. 
Distinct clades (groups) in the trees are given different coloured branches. The number of distinct 
groups differs per gene segment: five for segment 5, two for segment 6, and one for segments 7 
and 8. Furthermore, all eight segments of each virus are represented as eight parallel bars at the 
tips of each tree, with the colours in each segment's bar corresponding to the branches of the 
individual gene sequences to indicate reassorment. The final bar represents the geographic 
locations of the sequences in the tree. 
 
Figure 3. Supernetwork of 2016/2017 H5 HPAI viruses, based on full-genome sequences, 
generated by using maximum-likelihood (ML) phylogenetic trees of sorted sequences according 
to segments. The eight ML trees of the segments were used to calculate a supernetwork. Each 
reassortant is indicated by a different colour, and assembled into four groups. The seven most 
common reassortants are numbered #1 to #7. Less common reassortants (total: 4) are indicated 
in grey. Each circle represents full-genome of HPAI virus, the edges represent their phylogenetic 
relationship. Details as names, collection dates and coordinates are given in Table S8. 
 
Figure 4. Overview of the main reassortments described in this manuscript. Group designations 
and colours correspond to those in Figure 3. The positions of the reassortants correspond to the 
estimated dates of origin in Table 1. Dotted lines join the gene segments that are related.  
Figure 5. Geographical distribution of detected H5NX HPAI viruses with full genome sequences 
between the second quarter of 2016 and the second quarter of 2017. Viruses were detected from 
the east coast of Asia to the northwest coast of Europe, South to North Africa and in South Asia. 
Light green: reassortant #1. Dark green: reassortant #2. Red: reassortant #3. Purple: reassortant 
#4. Orange: reassortant #5. Light blue: reassortant #6. Dark blue: reassortant #7. Circle: Wild-
ans. Square: Wild-ans-long. Pentagon: Wild-other.  Rhomboid: Dom-ans. Triangle: Dom-gal. 
Inserts show magnified maps of (a) the Northwest coast of Europe, (b) Southern Africa and (c) 




Table 1. The names of the main reassortants, and the phylogenetic groups within each gene 
segment. 
Phylogenetic group per gene segment 
Reassortant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. Name Group 












sequences PB2 PB1 PA HA NP NA M1 NS1 
1 CABAD8AA I 5/1/16 
2/3/16 
11/15-4/16 16 C A B A D 8 A A 
2 CAEAF8AA I 9/10/16 
8/9/16 
5/16-9/16 13 " " E " F " " " 
3 AAAAA8AA II 8/27/16 
7/13/16 
5/16-8/16 109 A " A " A " " " 
4 AADAA8AA II 11/11/16 
10/3/16 
8/16-10/16 14 " " D " " " " " 
5 DCBAE5AA III 10/1/16 
26 Jul 2016 
5/16-9/16 15 D C B " E 5 " " 
6 BABAB8AA IV 10/19/16 
7 Sep 2016 
7/16-10/16 56 B A " " B 8 " " 
7 BDBAB8AA IV 12/2/16 
4 Nov 2016 







Table 2. Overview of spatio-temporal spread of reassortants of H5 HPAI viruses in the 2016/2017 
epidemic, from time of origin of most recent common ancestor (MRCA) to 1 July 2017. 
 
  Time of origin 
of MRCA 

























1 CABAD8AA Feb MW China not relevant   X  X 
3 
AAAAA8AA Jul MB 
Belarus to 
Kazakhstan wild bird 
X     
5 DCBAE5AA Jul MB Russia wild bird X    X 
2 





X X  X X 
6 





X     
4 





X     
7 
BDBAB8AA Nov MW 
Poland to 
Ukraine wild bird 
X     
 
a
Phase of life cycle of long-distance migratory birds breeding in Siberia: W, wintering; M, 
migration; B, breeding. 
b
Ural Mountains taken as geographical border between Europe and Asia. 
c





Table 3. Wild bird species, in which H5N8 HPAI virus was detected in dead birds found in the 
European Union between 1 October 2016 and 5 July 2017 and reported to the OIE, and in which 
at least some populations migrate long-distance. 
Species migrating long-distance
a 









Cygnus olor 1217 495 000 (54) (p. 46)
Tufted duck Aythya fuligula 190 1 800 000 (54) (p. 187)
Whooper swan Cygnus cygnus 149 57 000 (54) (p. 51)
Eurasian wigeon
b
Mareca penelope 89 1 810 000 (54) (p. 117)
Mallard
b
Anas platyrhynchos 55 3 250 000 (54) (p. 132)
Greater white-fronted goose Anser albifrons 15 1 365 000 (54) (p. 66)
Common pochard Aythya ferina 10 1 700 000 (54) (p. 177)
Common teal
b
Anas crecca 7 2 960 000 (54) (p. 123)
Common shelduck Tadorna tadorna 2 155 000 (54) (p. 101)
Lesser white-fronted goose Anser erythropus 2 63 000 (54) (p. 70)
Red-crested pochard Netta rufina 2 250 000 (54) (p. 171)
Bewick's swan Cygnus bewickii 2 17 000 (54) (p. 55)
Common goldeneye Bucephala clangula 1 420 000 (54) (p. 217)
Common fieldfare Turdus pilaris 1 42 850 000 (55)
a Here defined as wintering in the European Union and breeding at least beyond latitude 60 
degrees East, at the level of the Ural Mountains. 
b
 Those species that were also detected positive for H5N8 in 2014/2015 in Europe. 
